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Informational	privacy:	a	precondition	for	democratic
participation?
To	survive,	democracies	need	to	protect	citizens’	data	privacy,	even	against	their	inclinations	to	share	information
online,	writes	Wulf	Loh.
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The	value	of	informational	privacy	has	long	ceased	to	be	seen	merely	in	the	protection	or	exercise	of	individual
autonomy.		Already	in	the	early	1980s,	the	German	Federal	Court	pointed	out	that	the	political	autonomy	of	citizens
in	exercising	their	democratic	rights	and	duties	would	be	incompatible	with	a	‘social	and	legal	order	[…],	in	which
citizens	could	no	longer	know	who	knows	what	about	them,	when	and	on	what	occasion’	(BVerfGE	65,	1).	In	this
blog	post,	I	want	to	highlight	four	dangers	to	democratic	rule	that	may	arise	out	of	a	society,	in	which	privacy	rights
are	not	adequately	protected	or	are	even	disregarded.
Democratic	theory	accords	five	functions	to	the	public	sphere	in	general	and	citizens’	participation	in	particular:	the
aggregation	of	political	opinions	or	individual	interests;	the	public	deliberation	about	values	and	policies;	the
translation	of	these	public	discourses	for	political	institutions;	the	control	of	state	actors	and	political	officials;	and
finally	a	basic	social	integration	of	citizens	in	the	sense	of	a	feeling	of	being	connected	to	a	political	community
through	a	common	democratic	project.	Some	or	all	of	these	functions	are	potentially	compromised	by	certain
mechanisms	of	informational	privacy	management	through	state	institutions	or	commercial	actors.
1.	The	most	obvious	of	these	mechanisms	are	forms	of	openly	showcased	surveillance,	typically	by	law
enforcement	authorities.	CCTV	cameras	in	public	spaces	or	open	filming	of	street	protests	by	the	police	are	not	only
designed	to	retroactively	identify	law	infringement,	but	also	to	proactively	deescalate	protests	and	to	deter	potential
offenders.	These	kinds	of	surveillance	of	public	spaces	and	documentation	of	political	participation	become
problematic	for	the	above-mentioned	functions	of	democratic	systems,	in	the	event	that	the	monitored	subjects
develop	the	impression	that	they	have	to	fear	social	–	or	even	legal	–	sanctioning.
In	its	extreme	form,	the	result	of	such	a	form	of	surveillance	can	be	studied	from	the	social	credit	system	that	China
introduced	in	pilot	cities	such	as	Rongcheng	and	others.	In	such	a	system,	the	citizens	know	that	their	social
behaviour	is	registered	by	the	authorities,	and	unwanted	behaviour	is	sanctioned	by	withdrawing	privileges	or
enforcing	restrictions.	It	is	easy	to	see	that	already	a	widespread	fear	of	negative	consequences	will	likely	produce
normalising	behaviour	or	deter	citizens	from	participating	in	street	protests	at	all.	This	chilling	effect	has	immediate
repercussions	for	each	of	the	five	mentioned	functions	of	democratic	participation.
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2.	This	same	chilling	effect	can	occur	if	citizens	do	not	know	whether	they	are	being	monitored	or	not.	In	what	has
been	termed	the	‘panopticon	effect’,	a	normalisation	process	is	instantiated	through	the	mere	possibility	of	being
surveilled.	This	is	what	the	German	Federal	Court	warns	about	in	the	above-mentioned	quote	from	its	1983
decision.	In	much	the	same	way	as	with	open	surveillance,	citizens	may	be	deterred	from	participating	in
democratic	protests,	petitions,	movements,	online	debates	etc.
Such	a	chilling	effect	will	have	negative	repercussions	for	all	five	functions	of	political	participation.	This	may	prove
especially	problematic	for	already	marginalised	groups,	since	they	are	likely	to	have	even	less	voice	in	public	will
formation	and	aggregation	than	before.	In	turn,	a	loss	of	voice	will	affect	the	control	and	translation	functions	of
public	spheres,	if	certain	political	perspectives	are	absent	from	the	public	debate	and	a	potentially	one-sided
dominant	public	narrative	backs	specific	institutional	actors.	As	a	result,	disenfranchised	constituencies	may
completely	withdraw	from	political	participation	and	in	the	end	disengage	from	the	common	democratic	project,
which	puts	the	social	integrative	function	of	political	publics	under	stress.
3.	From	developmental	psychological	arguments	for	privacy,	according	to	which	the	formation	of	an	authentic
identity	and	a	positive	self-relationship	requires	at	least	phases	of	privacy,	another	connection	between
informational	privacy	and	political	participation	can	be	inferred:	without	such	an	identity	that	is	built	on
‘wholeheartedly’	accepted	life	choices	and	plans	(Frankfurt,	1987),	individuals	are	not	capable	of	acting	as
politically	responsible	citizens.	In	other	words,	the	civic	education	and	political	literacy	must	remain	incomplete
without	a	minimum	of	privacy	in	the	developmental	phase.
Hannah	Arendt	famously	concludes	that	‘everything	that	lives	[…]	emerges	from	darkness,	and	however	strong	its
natural	tendency	to	thrust	itself	into	the	light,	it	nevertheless	needs	the	security	of	darkness	to	grow	at	all’	(Arendt,
1954).	Only	in	such	a	safe	space,	adolescents	are	blocked	off	from	the	‘merciless’	eye	of	the	public	and	can
securely	try	out	different	roles	and	life	plans,	harmonise	their	own	conflicting	desires	and	self-images,	and
appropriate	them	as	their	own	identity	without	the	normalising	effects	of	public	scrutiny.
In	much	the	same	way	as	other	roles	and	patterns	of	behaviour,	the	citizen	role	has	to	be	learned,	i.e.,	certain	role
expectations	and	obligations	have	to	be	identified,	tried	out	and	internalised.	If	this	process	is	distorted	or	restricted,
there	is	a	danger	that	the	citizen	will	not	accept	her	political	responsibility,	or	even	become	apolitical	and	withdraw
from	political	participation	altogether.	Although	this	may	not	affect	the	aggregation	of	individual	interest	as	purported
by	a	liberal	model	of	democracy,	already	the	aggregation	of	opinions	about	the	common	good	will	most	likely
become	lopsided.	The	same	goes	for	the	other	four	functions,	especially	when	such	an	inadequate	civic	education
results	in	a	refusal	to	accept	one’s	responsibility	as	citizen	by	completely	withdrawing	from	political	participation.
4.	For	a	while	now,	filter	bubbles,	echo	chambers	and	the	strategy	of	micro-targeting	have	become	the	go-to
explanation	for	an	increased	polarisation	and	mutual	immunisation	of	opposed	political	camps	within	modern
democracies.	Each	of	these	mechanisms	relies	on	voluntary	or	involuntary	sacrifices	of	privacy:	the	more	personal
information	a	citizen	shares	online,	the	more	the	news	items	she	receives	are	likely	shaped	by	news	feed
algorithms	and	campaign	spin-doctors.	Disclosing	personal	information	in	the	context	of	social	media	or	political
campaign	contexts	results	in	a	personalisation	of	political	information	and	thereby	in	an	under-	or	misrepresentation
of	certain	political	positions.
This	is	especially	prevalent	in	social	media	filter	bubbles,	where	already	shared	political	convictions	dominate,	while
other	political	opinions	are	often	ridiculed	or	even	demonised	as	propaganda.	In	much	the	same	way,	micro-
targeting	aims	at	presenting	political	information	in	a	way	that	it	is	most	likely	accepted	by	a	specific	person.	This
polarisation	and	singularisation	mechanism	poses	a	series	of	challenges	for	the	five	functions	of	public	spheres	and
civic	participation:	publics	will	become	even	more	fragmented	and	–	what	is	worse	–	increasingly	immunised
against	each	other,	thereby	impeding	political	deliberation	and	the	translation	of	political	opinions.
Also,	the	control	function	will	be	increasingly	difficult	to	uphold,	if	polarisation	exceeds	a	certain	threshold	and	the
‘other	side’s’	demands	for	accountability	of	power-abusing,	corrupt	politicians	are	merely	seen	as	smear
campaigns.	Excessive	polarisation	will	also	very	likely	have	socially	disintegrative	effects,	as	there	is	no	longer	a
common	ground	in	the	form	of	a	thin	overarching	societal	public	sphere	that	can	uphold	a	shared	political	culture.
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As	we	have	seen	from	these	cursory	remarks,	informational	privacy	is	not	only	an	important	condition	for	individual
autonomy,	identity	formation,	and	intimate	relationships.	It	is	also	a	precursor	for	democratic	participation	and
political	public	spheres.	Democracy	as	a	‘government	of	the	people,	by	the	people,	for	the	people’	(Lincoln,	1863)
must	provide	public	arenas	in	addition	to	institutional	structures	for	political	opinion-forming,	democratic	control	and
judicial	review.	These,	in	turn,	must	not	only	ensure	the	possibility	for	its	citizens	to	participate	without	fear,	but	must
also	seek	to	integrate	diverse	political	discourses	and	provide	an	overarching	thin	political	culture,	in	order	to	enable
the	‘coexistence	and	association	of	different	men’	(Arendt,	2005).
Properly	functioning	public	spheres	that	can	secure	aggregation,	translation,	deliberation,	control,	and	social
integration	require,	as	we	have	seen,	informational	privacy.	The	four	dangers	for	public	spheres	and	political
participation	that	I	have	highlighted	above	make	this	clear.	For	their	own	sake,	democracies	need	to	protect	the
informational	privacy	of	its	citizens,	in	some	instances	even	against	their	inclinations	and	impulses	to	abundantly
share	information	online.	This	should	also	entail	–	but	is	not	limited	to	–	ensuring	that	the	citizen’s	consent	in	the
use	of	their	data	is	really	informed.
This	blog	post	is	a	short	abstract	of	a	paper	in	German	with	the	title	“Informationelle	Privatheit	als	Bedingung	für
Demokratie”,	which	will	be	published	in	the	journal	“Archiv	für	Rechts-	und	Sozialphilosophie”	in	early	2020.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author,	not	the	position	of	Democratic	Audit.	It	was	first	published	by	LSE	Business
Review.
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